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Cross-Strait Relations and Regional
Integration: A Review of the Ma Ying-jeou 
Era (2008–2016) 
Tung-chieh TSAI and Tony Tai-ting LIU 
Abstract: Despite the signing of the Economic Cooperation Frame-
work Agreement (ECFA) between mainland China and Taiwan in 
2010, Taiwan’s future status in the field of Asian regional integration 
remains unclear. While Taiwan remains outside the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership (RCEP), China’s rise and continued expansion in regional 
integration put increasing pressure on Taiwan to confront its political 
differences with China. This paper discusses the interconnection 
between regional integration and cross-Strait relations and seeks to 
address the implications such linkage entails. The authors note the 
exploitation of a two-pronged strategy by Beijing to pressure Taibei 
into confronting the political problem between China and Taiwan. In 
addition, the authors assess Taiwan’s performance in terms of its 
progress in the establishment of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
from 2008 to 2016 under the Ma Ying-jeou (Ma Yingjiu) administra-
tion and identify the hurdles and prospects for Taiwan’s future inte-
gration efforts. This paper concludes with a brief consideration of 
Taiwan’s New Southward Policy. 
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Introduction 
With the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agree-
ment (ECFA) between Taiwan and China in 2010, the international 
community was hopeful that Taiwan could once again utilise its role 
as a strategic hub in Asia by connecting trade in the region and serv-
ing as a window to the Greater China market. For Taiwan, the ECFA 
serves as an entry pass to plug into the fast-moving regional integra-
tion process within Asia, a phenomenon that has long been beyond 
the reach of the island nation. Taiwan’s reinforced relationship with 
the Chinese economy through the ECFA is expected to bring many 
untapped economic opportunities. Consequently, numerous obser-
vers anticipate that Taiwan will thus become an attractive partner for 
international cooperation. 
Nevertheless, under the omnipresent structure of delicate cross-
Strait relations, that is to say the political differences that separate 
Taiwan and China, regional integration for Taiwan cannot be consid-
ered without taking into account the role of China. In this article1, the 
authors review the advancements Taiwan has made in the process of 
regional integration over the past eight years (2008–2016) under the 
Ma Ying-jeou (俜㤡ҍ, Ma Yingjiu) administration and examine how 
the China factor has played out to curtail further progress since 2013. 
Specifically, the authors note the exploitation of a two-pronged strat-
egy by Beijing to pressure Taibei into confronting the political divide 
between China and Taiwan. The discussion is carried out in four 
parts: first, the authors provide an overview of recent developments 
in regional integration in the Asia Pacific area and Taiwan’s corres-
ponding status; then they address Taiwan’s former status in regional 
integration and the high hopes for the ECFA following political 
change on the island in 2008. In the third section, the authors assess 
the performance of the Ma Ying-jeou government in relation to re-
gional integration. Finally, they conclude with some reflections on the 
Ma government and considerations for the prospects of Taiwan’s 
advancement in regional integration in the near future. 

1 Revisions to this article were completed while the co-author carried out short-
term research in Australia under the generous support of the Ministry of Sci-
ence and Technology (MST), Taiwan (105-2917-I-005-001). The authors would 
like to thank the MST for its support and the anonymous reviewers for their 
comments and suggestions. 
  14 Tung-chieh Tsai and Tony Tai-ting Liu 

The Current State of Asia-Pacific Integration: 
The TPP, RCEP, and other Subregional Initiatives 
While the term “regional integration” harbours several different di-
mensions, its economic definition has perhaps been most strongly 
endorsed by Asian countries in recent years. Since the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997, countries in the Asia Pacific region have moved rapid-
ly towards the establishment of region-wide free trade. Largely 
spurred on by Western interventions through the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), which many observers have deemed as doing more 
harm than good, Asia’s leaders gathered in Malaysia in 1997 to con-
vene the first ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit between the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations and the three East Asian nations 
of China, Japan, and South Korea. Since then, various strategies for 
achieving integration in the Asia Pacific region, a phenomenon that 
entails not only active deliberations but also great power competition, 
have been proposed. Following the US return to Asia in 2009 – the 
Barack Obama administration’s strategy to shift its foreign policy 
focus from the Middle East and Europe to Asia – competition 
among Asian nations in the area of Asia Pacific regional integration 
reached an unprecedented level. This section briefly observes the 
main integration initiatives in the Asia Pacific and the corresponding 
status of Taiwan in the proposals. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
In November 2009 at the annual APEC summit, the US Trade Rep-
resentative (USTR) announced the participation of the United States 
in the expansion of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
Agreement (TPSEP or P4) to create the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP). The announcement brought instant global attention to the 
previously low-profiled “Pacific Four” (P4) agreement, a mini eco-
nomic partnership agreement established between Brunei, Chile, 
Singapore and New Zealand. In the face of China’s rise and Asia’s 
economic prosperity, Washington anticipated the establishment of 
the TPP as a way to assuage America’s economic decline by strength-
ening trade relations with Asia (Tsai and Liu 2013: 550). After several 
years of negotiations, the TPP was finally signed in New Zealand in 
February 2016 by 12 states: the original P4 countries plus the United 
States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. 
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Since the introduction of the TPP in 2009, Taiwan has shown a 
strong interest in participating in negotiations. China’s absence from 
the TPP has been an important driving force for Taiwan’s interest in 
the initiative. In addition, noting the TPP as an extension of APEC, 
Taiwan has also observed the potential benefits of its APEC mem-
bership status in its quest to participate in TPP negotiations (Wu Fu-
cheng 2016). Nonetheless, various issues continue to challenge Tai-
wan’s aspiration to join the TPP. International politics proves to be a 
major barrier. As Singapore prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, point-
ed out, “The participation of Taiwan in the TPP will depend on Chi-
na, as other countries in the TPP need to manage their relations with 
China” (Aseanup.com 2016). Although the Taiwan government is eager 
to gain TPP membership, as in Japan and Canada the TPP has gener-
ated widespread debate within Taiwan about the impact of liberalisa-
tion on the local agricultural industry, the environment, and intellec-
tual property rights, to the extent that a consensus on TPP member-
ship has yet to be reached on the island. Meanwhile, the United States 
has not yet responded directly to Taiwan’s expression of interest in 
the TPP. Many observers point to the unresolved issue of US beef 
and pork exports to Taiwan as a key obstacle (Chang Jing-wen 2015; 
Dai 2015). 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
In 1997, in the midst of the Asian Financial Crisis, the ASEAN 
member countries and China, Japan, and South Korea joined hands 
to establish the ASEAN Plus Three (APT). The APT was conceived 
by member states as the dominant model for Asian regional integra-
tion in the future. In 2005, the APT expanded to include six members 
outside the ASEAN with the participation of Australia, New Zealand, 
and India. Currently, the 16 member states of ASEAN Plus Six serve 
as the foundation for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership (RCEP), a regional integration initiative advocated by 
ASEAN in 2012. Although discussions abound for the establishment 
of ASEAN Plus Eight following the participation of the United 
States and Russia at the Sixth East Asia Summit in 2011 (Bobowski 
2016: 48–50), such a development has not materialised into region-
wide economic cooperation. As of February 2016, the member states 
of the RCEP had conducted 11 rounds of negotiations. 
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Noting the RCEP as an alternative to the TPP, Taiwan has also 
expressed a strong interest in participating in the initiative. While 
some observers view the RCEP as a China-led counter proposal to 
the TPP (Hung and Liu 2012; Chang, Gordon 2015; Morimoto 
2016), Taiwan finds no contradiction in potentially participating in 
both initiatives, following in the footsteps of countries that are al-
ready party to both RCEP and TPP negotiations, such as Singapore, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Australia, and New Zealand. In particular, 
following the conclusion of the ECFA and the ensuing détente across 
the Strait, Taiwan has repeatedly made clear to China its interest in 
RCEP membership. However, as Bonnie Glaser (2013: 28) observed, 
nothing substantive has been agreed upon since honorary Kuomin-
tang (ѝ഻഻≁唘 , Zhongguo guomindang, KMT) chairman Wu Poh-
hsiung (੣՟䳴, Wu Boxiong) directly communicated Taiwan’s desire 
to join the RCEP to mainland Chinese President Xi Jinping in June 
2013. In 2014, the deputy minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs 
Council (བྷ䲨င଑ᴳ, Dalu weiyuanhui, MAC), Steve Lin (᷇⾆హ, Lin 
Zujia), issued a statement calling for China and Taiwan to “jointly 
study” the potential for further economic cooperation for the larger 
goal of regional integration (Wang 2014). However, Beijing has yet to 
respond to the request. 
China–Japan–Korea Free Trade Area 
In 1999, in a separate breakfast meeting hosted during the APT 
summit in Manila, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji met with his 
Japanese and South Korean counterparts, Keizo Obuchi and Kim 
Dae-jung, respectively, for discussions on pushing forward coopera-
tion in East Asia. The informal summit in the Philippines eventually 
became the precursor of the China–Japan–South Korea trilateral 
summit held alongside the annual APT summit. After the organisa-
tion of several rounds of talks through the APT framework, in 2008, 
the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea conducted the first 
trilateral summit independent of the APT and began the process of 
institutionalising the interface.  
In terms of regional integration, the commencement of trilateral 
cooperation in 1999 also established an improved atmosphere for 
economic advancement. At the annual APT summit in 2001, Chinese 
Prime Minister Zhu officially proposed the idea of establishing a 
Northeast Asia free trade area consisting of China, Japan, and South 
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Korea (Lee 2014: 172). With the three nations’ adoption of The Ac-
tion Strategy on Trilateral Cooperation, in 2004, interest in the estab-
lishment of a China–Japan–Korea Free Trade Area (CJKFTA) picked 
up. A formal Joint Study Committee was launched in May 2010, con-
cluding its work in a Joint Study Report in December 2011. Since the 
launch of negotiations in 2013, five rounds have been carried out. 
Although Taiwan enjoys an abundance of trade with China, Ja-
pan, and South Korea, the island nation is not a member of the 
CJKFTA negotiations. Aside from the ECFA with China, Taiwan has 
not established any other trade agreements with Japan or South Korea. 
However, in 2011, Taiwan and Japan concluded a bilateral investment 
agreement. Considering that Taiwan and Japan share a strong unoffi-
cial relationship, it is possible that trade and other functional coopera-
tion may be consolidated in the future. 
Where is Taiwan within Integration? Political 
Change and High Hopes for the ECFA 
Although the Asia Pacific region has advanced quickly towards eco-
nomic integration over the past decade, Taiwan, the 22nd largest 
economy according to IMF (2016) statistics (based on gross domestic 
produce (GDP) adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP)), remains 
sidelined from the process. Noting the fact that Taiwan belongs to 
the group of four Asian tiger economies whose growth in the 1980s 
was commonly referred to as the “Asian economic miracle,” the is-
land nation’s poor record in integration is bewildering. Since joining 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1991 and 
before its change of government in 2008, Taiwan had concluded just 
four free trade agreements (FTA), all of which were with diplomatic 
allies in Central America. In a sense, as one of the key drivers of 
Asia’s economic boom before 1990, Taiwan’s current economic sta-
tus can be deemed a “miracle” in itself as the island continues to be 
outside integration in the Asia Pacific region. 
Nonetheless, leaving out the possibilities for self-seclusion, pol-
itics – most notably the often uneasy relationship between Taiwan 
and China – plays a major role in hindering Taiwan’s efforts to par-
ticipate in regional integration. Taiwan, as Beijing has long claimed, is 
not recognised as a state or a legal political entity, and hence does not 
have the status and capacity to participate in an international com-
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munity largely founded upon sovereignty. With the retreat of the 
Nationalist KMT army to Taiwan and the proclamation of the People’s 
Republic of China in Beijing in 1949, the Beijing government’s persis-
tence that it should be recognised internationally as the sole legal 
China (the One China principle) has persisted in its treatment of Tai-
wan on the international stage, which culminated with the ousting of 
the Republic of China (Taiwan) from the United Nations in 1971. A 
simple survey of completed FTAs from around the world suggests 
that sovereignty is not only a necessity for parties to the agreement, 
but also almost a precondition for commencing negotiations. As 
such, the de-recognition of Taiwan has left Taibei in a vulnerable 
position in terms of the competition to establish FTAs within the 
Asia Pacific region, while China, with its economic and political rise 
since the 1990s, remains at the heart of integration in Asia. 
Following a switch in ruling party in 2008, the new Nationalist 
(KMT) government sought to “rectify” Taiwan’s abysmal record in 
regional integration by seeking political reconciliation with China and 
an end to diplomatic competition across the Taiwan Strait. Headed by 
calls for a “diplomatic truce” (ཆӔՁޥ, waijiao xiubing) and “flexible 
diplomacy” (⍫䐟ཆӔ, huolu waijiao), the newly incumbent president, 
Ma Ying-jeou, hoped to improve Taiwan’s foreign relations, and eco-
nomic relations, by setting aside the political differences between 
Taibei and Beijing in order to focus on the potential for functional 
cooperation across the Strait. In 2009, Ma further summed up his 
diplomatic aspirations in a 16-character phrase that encourages both 
Taiwan and China to “confront reality, establish mutual trust, set 
aside disputes, and jointly establish a win-win situation” (↓㿆⨮ሖǃ
ᔪ・ӂؑǃᬡ㖞⡝䆠ǃޡࢥ䴉䌿, zhengshi xianshi, jianli huxin, gezhi 
zhengyi, gongchuang shuangying) (Lee 2010: 72). The goodwill expressed 
by Taibei under the Ma government was eventually echoed by Beijing 
and established the foundation for increased interaction and coopera-
tion between Taiwan and China. 
Politically, Taibei and Beijing agreed to conform to the ambigu-
ous notion of the “92 Consensus” (ҍҼޡ䆈 , jiu er gongshi), an 
“agreement” reached between Taiwan and China at the 1992 Koo–
Wang summit between Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) chairman 
Koo Chen-fu and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits 
(ARATS) chairman Wang Daohan. At the meeting, the two sides 
agreed to recognise the fact that there is only one China in the world, 
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but yet leave space for interpretation as to the official representative 
of the Chinese state. The “agreement to not agree” sat well with Tai-
bei’s new policy of setting aside political differences, and in turn led 
to the completion of the “three links” (й䙊, san tong: postal, transpor-
tation, and trade links) and functional cooperation across the Strait in 
the areas of tourism, education, combating criminality, and food safe-
ty. In terms of economic exchange, in 2010, after five rounds of 
meetings between SEF chairman Chiang Pin-kung (⊏щඔ , Jiang 
Bingkun) and ARATS chairman Chen Yunlin (䱸Ӂ᷇) – the so-called 
“Chiang–Chen Talks” which were the successor of the Koo–Wang 
Talks that broke off in 1999 due to political tensions, Taiwan and 
China agreed on the ECFA. This was conceived with the aim of re-
moving barriers between the signatories and realising the full eco-
nomic potential of the free movement of goods across the Taiwan 
Strait. Currently, under the ECFA, Taiwan and China have concluded 
an early harvest agreement that allows 539 products to be traded 
across the Strait with reduced tariff barriers, while negotiations for a 
formal goods trade agreement continue. In addition, Taiwan has also 
concluded agreements in service trade and investment with China. 
Prior to the conclusion of the ECFA, many observers lent their 
support to the idea of a trade agreement between Taiwan and China. 
For example, at a forum in Taibei, US economist Michael Porter said 
that there were no practical alternatives to concluding the ECFA 
(Taipei Times 2010). Porter also pointed out that he was confident that 
Taiwan would be much better off with the ECFA than without it. 
Furthermore, echoing Porter, Japanese business strategist Kennichi 
Ohmae also noted the ECFA as “a carefully crafted ‘tonic’ for Tai-
wan’s continued success” (Lu 2010). Following on from these rosy 
assessments on the potential benefits of the ECFA, some observers 
went as far as to envision the possibility for further political reconcili-
ation (Jiang and Hayashi 2015). However, such optimism can only be 
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The Scorecard: Assessing Taiwan and Regional 
Integration under the Ma Ying-jeou Government 
(2008–2016)
Since the conclusion of the ECFA in 2010, economic exchange be-
tween Taiwan and mainland China has steadily increased. According 
to statistics released by the Mainland Affairs Council, the Taiwan 
ministry responsible for China affairs, in the eight years under the Ma 
Ying-jeou administration, Taiwan’s trade with China as a proportion 
of its total trade increased from 21.2 per cent in 2008 to 22.7 per cent 
in 2015 (MAC 2016a). While export to China began to decline after 
an initial hike to 30.9 per cent of all Taiwanese exports in 2010, it is 
important to note that China’s exports to Taiwan grew steadily from 
2008 to 2015, improving from 15.3 per cent of all Taiwanese imports 
in 2008 to 19.3 per cent in 2015. As overall trade activities between 
Taiwan and China advanced under the Ma administration, debates on 
the effectiveness of Taibei’s policies towards China, especially the 
ECFA, ensued. The widely divergent opinions of supporters and 
opponents of the ECFA have made the topic difficult to discuss in 
Taiwan, with some warning against drawing premature conclusions 
on an agreement that is still in progress (Tan 2010) and others warn-
ing against the danger of Taiwan becoming excessively dependent 
economically on China (Hsu 2014). Now that the Ma era has come to 
a close, the authors assess Taibei’s performance in terms of regional 
integration, asking the question of whether Taiwan’s status in Asia 
Pacific regional integration increased or not over the past eight years 
under the Ma Ying-jeou leadership. 
Taiwan Achieved Limited Success in Regional  
Integration amidst Reconciliation with China 
In a sense, if the ECFA is understood as a de facto FTA that cleverly 
circumvents the political sensitivities of cross-Strait relations regard-
less of changes in the trade balance between Taiwan and China, the 
framework agreement could be interpreted as a successful step to-
wards reinforcing bilateral trade and a gesture towards political rec-
onciliation. While growth of just 1.5 per cent in Taiwan’s overall trade 
with China over a span of eight years may appear humble, it is im-
portant to look beyond the numbers to the spillover effects of the 
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ECFA to make a balanced assessment of the agreement. Two aspects 
in particular will be examined: functional cooperation that stemmed 
from the foundation of the ECFA; and Taiwan’s participation in 
regional integration. 
When the authors looked beyond the trade statistics for the period 
(see Table 1), which are subject to fluctuation due to a variety of fac-
tors, including political tensions, geopolitical conflicts, changes in 
global outlook among others, and examined the ECFA in more de-
tail, it became apparent that, as its name suggests, it has established 
an overarching framework for further economic cooperation between 
Taiwan and China. After realising the first phase of trade liberalisa-
tion through the “early harvest” list of tariff concessions through the 
ECFA in 2010, Taibei and Beijing have gone on to complete negotia-
tions on investment and service trade, and have commenced talks on 
the reduction of barriers to trade in goods. Thus, it could be argued 
that the spirit and drive for cooperation encapsulated in the ECFA 
have spilled over to other related areas. Furthermore, these areas have 
garnered consideration as a result of expanding economic coopera-
tion between Taiwan and China. 
Table 1. Cross-Strait Trade Exchange (2010–2015) 
Year 
Total Trade Volume 
(100 million USD) 
Rate of Increase (%) 
2010 1207.8 39.5 
2011 1347.1 11.5 
2012 1216.4 -4.6 
2013 1243.8 2.3 
2014 1301.9 4.7 
2015 1154.1 -11.3 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council 2016b. 
For example, at the eighth round of Chiang–Chen Talks in 2012, 
Taiwan and China agreed on customs cooperation (see Table 2). Such 
cooperation takes into account the importance of coordination in 
anti-trafficking operations and communications following the poten-
tial expansion of cross-Strait trade under the ECFA. However, it 
should also be noted that, while the ECFA was under negotiation 
following Ma’s election to president in 2008, discussion on issues as  
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Table 2. Outcomes of SEF-ARATS Talks (2008–2016) 
Round Date Location Agreements Reached 
1 June 2008 Beijing 
Minutes of Talks on Cross-Strait Charter 
Flights; Cross-Strait Agreement concerning 
Mainland Tourists Traveling to Taiwan  
2 November 2008 Taibei 
Cross-Strait Food Safety Agreement; 
Cross-Strait Air Transport Agreement; 
Cross-Strait Sea Transport Agreement; 
Cross-Strait Postal Service Agreement 
3 April 2009 Nanjing 
Cross-Strait Agreement on Joint Crime-
Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance; 
Cross-Strait Financial Cooperation Agree-
ment; Supplementary Agreement on Cross-
Strait Air Transport 
4 December 2009 Taizhong 
Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation of 
Agricultural Product Quarantine and In-
spection; Cross-Strait Agreement on Coop-
eration in respect of Standards, Metrology, 
Inspection and Accreditation; Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Cooperation in respect of 
Fishing Crew Affairs 
5 June 2010 Chong-qing 
Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement; Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights 
Protection and Cooperation 
6 December 2010 Taibei 
Cross-Strait Agreement on Medical and 
Health Cooperation 
7 October 2011 Tianjin 
Cross-Strait Nuclear Power Safety Cooper-
ation Agreement 
8 August 2012 Taibei 
Cross-Strait Investment Protection and 
Promotion Agreement; Cross-Strait Cus-
toms Cooperation Agreement 
9 March 2013 Taibei 
Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices 
10 February 2014 Nanjing 
Cross-Strait Cooperation Agreement on 
Meteorology; Cross-Strait Agreement on 
Seismological Monitoring 
11 August 2015 Fuzhou 
Cross-Strait Collaboration Agreement on 
Flight Safety and Airworthiness; Cross-
Strait Agreement on Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and Enhancement of Tax Coop-
eration 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council 2016d. 
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far ranging as protection of intellectual property rights, financial co-
operation, agricultural and animal inspection, and air and maritime 
shipping was ongoing. By the end of 2015, the Ma government had 
concluded 23 cooperation treaties with China and had significantly 
improved the institutional structure governing interactions across the 
Strait (Mainland Affairs Council 2016c). In such a respect, Taiwan 
became more closely integrated with China under the Ma Ying-jeou 
administration, which in turn could be said to move the island state 
closer to the process of regional integration in the Asia Pacific, evi-
denced by Taibei’s commencement of FTA studies and talks with the 
likes of Singapore, New Zealand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
India. 
Following the completion of the ECFA, Taiwan began making 
headway towards regional integration via trade agreements. In 2013, 
Taiwan concluded the New Zealand–Taiwan Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (ANZTEC) and the Singapore–Taiwan Economic Part-
nership Agreement (ASTEP). While New Zealand is only the 39th 
largest export market for Taiwan and Singapore, although Taiwan’s 
fourth largest export market (Bureau of Foreign Trade 2016), is sig-
nificantly smaller than the United States and Japan, the completion of 
ANZTEC and ASTEP nonetheless represents a possible break-
through in Taiwan’s foreign economic relations. Besides the 2010 
ECFA, Taiwan had not signed any trade agreements since the com-
pletion of the FTA with El Salvador and Honduras in May 2007. 
Even before any economic benefits have been taken into account, the 
signing of ANZTEC and ASTEP has boosted Taiwan’s confidence in 
terms of its long-awaited entry into the Asian integration process. 
Since 2013, Taiwan has completed joint studies with Indonesia, the 
Philippines and India on the possibility of establishing economic 
partnership agreements (see Table 3). 
However, if the definition of regional integration is taken as in-
volvement in multilateral economic institutions or negotiations, Tai-
wan continues to be left out of the process. Despite repeated expres-
sions of interest to participate in both the TPP and the RCEP, Tai-
wan has neither achieved observer status nor ascended to negotia-
tions. In terms of the TPP, while Washington has not ruled out the 
possibility of Taiwan becoming a member of the TPP in the near 
future, it has also not supported Taiwan’s aspiration openly. Regard-
ing the RCEP, meanwhile, Beijing has yet to respond directly to Tai-
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bei’s expressions of interest. In short, despite the completion of trade 
agreements with Singapore and New Zealand and joint studies on 
potential cooperation with several other states, Taiwan continues to 
be shut out from the process of regional integration, a process that is 
gaining speed and leaving Taiwan further behind. 
Table 3. Current Status of Regional Integration by Taiwan 
Time Partner(s) Agreement Status 
2003 Panama Taiwan–Panama Free Trade Agreement complete 
2005 Guatemala Taiwan–Guatemala Free Trade Agree-ment complete 
2006 Nicaragua Taiwan–Nicaragua Free Trade Agree-ment complete 
2007 El Salvador Honduras 
Taiwan–El Salvador and Honduras  
Free Trade Agreement complete 
2010 China Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) complete 
2011 Japan Taiwan–Japan Investment Agreement complete 
2013 New Zealand New Zealand–Taiwan Economic Co-operation Agreement (ANZTEC) complete 
2013 Singapore Singapore–Taiwan Economic Partner-ship Agreement (ASTEP) complete 
2013 United States Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) 
under  
negotiation 
2014 Indonesia Economic Cooperation Agreement completed initial studies
2014 The Philip-pines Economic Cooperation Agreement 
completed 
joint studies 
2015 India Economic Cooperation Agreement completed joint studies 
2015 European Union Economic Cooperation Agreement 
under  
evaluation 
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs 2016. 
Beijing’s Shifting Stance and Implications for Taiwan 
In retrospect, many observers may argue that the relationship be-
tween Taiwan and China improved considerably under the Ma Ying-
jeou government, especially in contrast with the preceding Democrat-
ic Progressive Party (≁ѫ䙢↕唘, Minzhu jinbu dang, DPP) govern-
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ment, which witnessed a significant retreat in relations across the 
Strait (Chang 2012; Matsuda 2015: 7–8). While increased interaction 
in terms of tourism, academic and student exchange, and shipping 
and trade under the Ma administration should not be denied, an 
equally important shift in China’s attitude towards Taiwan that has 
slowly built up following leadership change on the mainland should 
be noted as well. The succession of Xi Jinping as China’s president in 
late 2012 and the implications of this transition of power in Beijing 
were to have a strong effect on cross-Strait relations. 
When observing the development of Taiwan–China relations in 
recent years, it is important to note that, in 2012, China underwent a 
leadership transition, while Taiwan retained its incumbent KMT gov-
ernment under President Ma for a second term. Prior to this, recon-
ciliation and high hopes for cooperation between Taibei and Beijing 
had been evident under the respective administrations of Ma Ying-
jeou and Hu Jintao. While David Lampton (2014) and others have 
convincingly pointed out that decision-making in Beijing has taken on 
an oligarchic form since the 1990s, one should not downplay the 
policy changes that occurred after the transition from Hu Jintao to Xi 
Jinping in China. Prior to ascending to the presidency, Xi, the son of 
first-generation Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Zhong-
xun (㘂Ԣण), had extensive experience in Fujian Province, China’s 
window onto Taiwan. While there, Xi served in various official capa-
cities, such as the mayor of Xiamen, permanent member of the CCP 
Fujian Provincial Committee, and governor of Fujian Province. Xi’s 
experience of Taiwan affairs coupled with the gradual reconsolidation 
of authority in Beijing may have contributed to China’s increasingly 
hard-line stance towards Taiwan since 2012; a phenomenon that had 
rarely occurred in the late Hu Jintao era. 
For example, at a track-two meeting with Taiwan’s former vice 
president, Vincent Siew (㮝㩜䮧 , Xiao Wanchang), at the annual 
APEC summit in Bali in 2013, just one year into office, mainland 
President Xi expressed his wish to see the political differences sepa-
rating Taiwan and China be gradually resolved. In Xi’s words, “the 
problems cannot be passed on from generation to generation without 
end […] Beijing is willing to make reasonable arrangements under the 
One-China framework” (CPC News 2015). Then, in September 2014, 
when receiving a visiting group of representatives from peace and 
pro-unification organisations in Taiwan, Xi once again reiterated the 
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One-China principle and that “unification across the Strait means an 
end to political differences, not the reproduction of territory and 
sovereignty” (Xi 2015). In 2015, the official mouthpiece of the CCP, 
the People’s Daily (Ӫ≁ᰕᣕ, Renmin Ribao), released an article that 
summarised Xi Jinping’s attitude towards Taiwan in the “five hearts” 
(ӄᗳ, wu xin) catchphrase: confidence (ؑᗳ, xinxin), patience (㙀ᗳ, 
naixin), sincerity (䃐ᗳ, chengxin), common will (啺ᗳ, qixin), and de-
termination (⊪ᗳ, juexin) (Li 2015). In short and quite literally, Bei-
jing is confident, patient and determined that the Taiwan problem 
will be resolved in the not too distant future. Such a determination 
was not openly expressed by Hu Jintao. 
While China has not resorted to the use of force or intimidation 
(as in the case of the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis) beyond verbal 
admonitions to resolve its political differences with Taiwan, Beijing 
has seemingly adopted a two-pronged strategy that seeks to force 
Taibei to come to terms with the political question of unification. To 
a great extent, China’s strategy rests on the fact that Taiwan remains 
largely isolated from regional integration in the Asia Pacific and Bei-
jing has sufficient power to influence Taiwan’s ascension to the pro-
cess. By assuming the leadership role in regional integration in recent 
years, as Tony Tai-Ting Liu (2015) pointed out, China has, on the one 
hand, effectively generated a dilemma for Taiwan’s leadership: the 
need to confront cross-Strait relations and regional integration to-
gether; integration cannot be further advanced without negotiations 
with China. Meanwhile, on the other hand, Beijing continues to ad-
vocate One China as the guiding principle for all dealings with Tai-
wan on the international stage.  
Good recent examples of China’s two-pronged strategy at work 
can be seen in its attitude towards Taiwan during the One Belt, One 
Road initiative (formally known as the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, э㔨ѻ䐟㓿⍾ᑖ઼ 21ц㓚⎧к
э㔨ѻ䐟, Sichou zhi lu jingjidai he 21 shiji haishang sichou zhi lu; simpli-
fied to аᑖа䐟, Yidai yilu, OBOR) and the establishment of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), both of which were 
proposed in succession by Xi Jinping in late 2013. While the OBOR 
focuses on strengthening economic cooperation with countries across 
Eurasia and the AIIB aims to become a global institution dedicated to 
financial cooperation, the two initiatives are complementary projects 
undertaken by China to advance its world-power status. In terms of 
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regional integration, the OBOR seeks to amalgamate regional and 
subregional processes such as the CJKFTA, the China–ASEAN FTA 
(CAFTA) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) into a 
massive cooperation scheme spanning Eurasia. Meanwhile, the AIIB 
with its emphasis on infrastructure investment is in place to provide 
financial resources for the construction of roads, highways, railways, 
and channels that tangibly connect countries in the OBOR (Swaine 
2015; He 2015). 
Although Taiwan is not disinterested in Beijing’s new proposals 
and the corresponding economic opportunities these may bring, the 
island nation has been marginalised by China and can only watch 
developments from the side lines. Though the New Silk Road strate-
gy was conceived to include all Asian countries, China has yet to ex-
tend an invitation to Taiwan to join the OBOR initiative. By imple-
menting its two-pronged strategy, China continues to strengthen 
cooperation with other Asian countries through OBOR, while mak-
ing Taiwan’s already feeble status in regional integration even weaker. 
Furthermore, China’s adamant position vis-à-vis One China is also 
having a negative impact on Taiwan as it looks to development on 
the island. On 17 January 2016, the president of the AIIB, Jin Liqun  
(䠁・㗔), boldly rejected Taiwan’s expression of interest to join the 
AIIB upon its establishment on the grounds that the island “is not 
sovereign or responsible for the conduct of its international relations” 
(Wu Xiang-yuan 2016). 
In short, despite Taiwan’s success in concluding trade agree-
ments with Singapore and New Zealand in 2013, China’s two-prong-
ed strategy has meant that the island has made little progress towards 
regional integration beyond further negotiations with China under the 
ECFA framework. Thus, one might argue that the Ma government’s 
initial advancements in regional integration tapered off severely after 
2013, when China under the newly incumbent Xi Jinping began to 
step up its pressure against Taiwan having an international presence. 
Conclusion: Reflections on the Ma Ying-jeou 
Era and the Future Prospects for Taiwan and 
Regional Integration 
Overall, one might argue that cross-Strait relations generally im-
proved under the Ma Ying-jeou administration. Not only were ten-
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sions greatly reduced across the Strait, but the recommencement of 
dialogue through the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) initiat-
ed functional cooperation between Taiwan and China that did not 
necessarily highlight political differences. In addition, the ECFA facil-
itated trade across the Strait and established the foundation for fur-
ther cooperation between Taiwan and China in the near future. Al-
though sceptics warn against Taiwan becoming overly economically 
dependent on the Chinese economy, such claims should be balanced 
by the increased institutional development and collaboration between 
Taiwan and China that effectively move the Taiwan Strait towards 
peace and stability, and away from conflict. 
Nevertheless, Taiwan’s continued isolation from regional inte-
gration processes in the Asia Pacific remains an issue that warrants 
vigilance. While Taiwan has completed trade agreements with Singa-
pore and New Zealand, and has commenced joint feasibility studies 
for FTAs with a number of Asian countries, the fact that Taiwan 
remains outside regional integration movements remained unchanged 
during the Ma Ying-jeou era. One hope, however, is that the ECFA 
may serve as a convenient shortcut for Taiwan’s future participation 
in Asian regional integration. With China playing central roles in the 
RCEP and the CJKFTA, for instance, assuming that trade agree-
ments for goods and services under the ECFA can be completed in 
the near future, Taiwan may find itself with access to markets that 
have integrated with China (for example, Southeast Asia). However, 
current developments in the Asia Pacific seem to be moving rapidly 
along a trajectory that is unfavourable for Taiwan. While Taiwan 
continues to negotiate for trade liberalisation under the ECFA, other 
neighbouring countries are also negotiating for both bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation agreements, with many moving at a signifi-
cantly faster pace than the island nation. Although Taiwan may have 
the advantage of direct access to China – Asia’s biggest market – 
once the ECFA is complete, the politics of cross-Strait relations sug-
gest that the path ahead is full of uncertainties. 
These uncertainties were compounded in January 2016, when 
Taiwan underwent its first party transition since 2008 with the elec-
tion of DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen (㭑㤡᮷, Cai Ying-
wen). In contrast to her predecessor, Tsai has expressed hopes of 
distancing Taiwan from China while searching for alternative eco-
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nomic opportunities that do not necessitate crossing paths with Bei-
jing. Tsai’s position follows on from a line of argument she presented 
in an open debate with fellow presidential runner Ma Ying-jeou in 
2012, in which she claimed that  
the DPP walks towards the world and walks towards China with 
the world, while the KMT walks towards China and walks towards 
the world with China. (Taiwan Public Television Service Founda-
tion 2011)  
In terms of foreign policy, such a stance has translated into the re-
initiation of the “Southward Policy” (ইੁ᭯ㆆ, Nanxiang zhengce), a 
policy that seeks to encourage Taiwanese business people (ਠ୶ , 
taishang) to perhaps desist from going west to China and to redirect 
investment and trade to South and Southeast Asia. Corresponding 
with such a policy turn, the ruling DPP has established the New 
Southbound Policy Office (ᯠইੁ᭯ㆆ䗖ޜᇔ, Xin nanxiang zhengce 
bangongshi) and the ASEAN and South Asia Think Tank (ᶡ঄㠷ইӎ
⹄ウᲪᓛ, Dongxie yu nanya yanjiu zhiku). The DPP director for inter-
national relations, James Chih-fang Huang (哳ᘇ㣣, Huang Zhifang), 
has proclaimed that the new units have been established to promote 
exchanges and people-to-people interactions with South and South-
east Asia (The China Post 2016). 
Although it is much too early to draw conclusions about Tai-
wan’s new Southward Policy, in light of recent developments in Asian 
regional integration, however, it is possible to identify several factors 
that may potentially affect Taiwan’s efforts towards integration. First, 
China will continue to be the dominant factor in Taiwan’s foreign 
policy, even if the latter pivots southward and seeks to circumvent 
Beijing’s isolation strategy. As Tsai Tung-chieh (2016) points out, the 
success of the new Southward Policy may rest on the precondition 
that China “keeps a blind eye” to Taibei’s actions. In other words, the 
politics of cross-Strait relations may once again stand in the way of 
Taiwan’s aspiration to expand its diplomatic frontier; the One-China 
policy may once again be used by Beijing as a tool to block Taiwan’s 
attempts to expand economic cooperation with India and the 
ASEAN states however these manifest, whether in the form of bilat-
eral or multilateral trade agreements. 
Second, through its Southward Policy Taiwan will also be enter-
ing into free-trade rivalries in Southeast Asia that are contiguous with 
the great power competition in the region. In addition, China, Japan, 
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South Korea, and India have all already established FTAs with 
ASEAN and the United States has invested considerable time and 
energy in strengthening its relationship with ASEAN under Barack 
Obama’s leadership. While not impossible, Taiwan may need to find 
creative ways to navigate among the powers. 
Third, the US position concerning Taiwan is also critical. With 
the formal establishment of the TPP in February 2016, China’s non-
involvement in the agreement means that Taiwan may be presented 
with an opportunity to participate in regional integration in the Asia 
Pacific without the burden of cross-Strait relations. However, despite 
Taiwan’s repeated expressions of interest to participate in negotia-
tions, the United States has not responded directly to date. Some scep-
tics note that the reason for US passivity might concern the standstill 
in negotiations over pork and beef exports to Taiwan, while others 
caution that the high standards of the TPP may be a reason to avoid 
the agreement. In addition, as Wei Zi-di (2016) points out, the recently 
completed TPP agreement also embodies a political nuance that es-
capes many analyses. Of the 12 current member states of the TPP, 
two-thirds of the members (Australia, New Zealand, Peru, Chile, Sin-
gapore, Vietnam, Burma, and Malaysia) have already concluded bilat-
eral trade agreements with China. Therefore, whether or not Taiwan 
can avoid the China factor through the TPP remains to be seen. 
Finally, one more relevant factor that may influence the fate of 
Taiwan and its foreign policy is the development of US–China rela-
tions. Like Taiwan, the United States is also set to undergo a leader-
ship transition in 2016. While it is difficult to foresee the outcome of 
the US presidential election and the potential policy changes in the 
near future, for Taiwan perhaps the most critical question is how 
Washington and Beijing will establish their relationship once the new 
US president is inaugurated. Although history suggests that Taiwan 
can benefit from competition between the United States and China by 
playing off the great powers, one should not dismiss lightly the possi-
bility that America and China, noting new issues for dialogue and 
cooperation, may consider options other than conflict in the Taiwan 
Strait. Even though Taiwan may not be an entirely passive player in 
great power politics, how much policy space the island nation has to 
manoeuvre between the powers remains unclear. Thus, Taiwan’s suc-
cess in regional integration in the near future may depend on how well 
the island balances between the United States and China. 
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